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 With the creation of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), an area of international law 
may have become more like law as we commonly perceive it.  Yet it is not necessarily the 
neutral technocratic process some of its proponents make it to be. Whatever is one’s perspective 
on trade liberalization and its enforcement, developing countries and developing country 
constituents are at a disadvantage before the WTO’s dispute settlement system. If the United 
States and European Community (“EC”) have dozens of well-trained governmental lawyers and 
still frequently rely on assistance from private law firms, enterprises, and trade associations, how 
can developing countries manage? 
 Developing countries vary significantly in terms of the size of their economies and the 
role of law in their domestic systems. Nonetheless, they generally face three primary challenges 
if they are to participate effectively in the WTO dispute settlement system. These challenges are: 
(i) a relative lack of legal expertise in WTO law and the capacity to organize information 
concerning trade barriers and opportunities to challenge them; (ii) constrained financial 
resources, including for the hiring of outside legal counsel to effectively use the WTO legal 
system, which has become increasingly costly; and (iii) fear of political and economic pressure 
from members exercising market power, and in particular the United States and EC, undermining 
their ability to bring WTO claims. We can roughly categorize these challenges as constraints of 
legal knowledge, financial endowment, and political power, or, more simply, of law, money and 
politics.2
This paper explores various strategies for responding to these three challenges, none of 
which involves a modification of the rules of the WTO’s Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the DSU), or of WTO jurisprudence. WTO members have 
been discussing an amendment of the DSU through a special negotiating session since 1997, but 
without reaching any consensus.3 This paper does not address the challenges posed by WTO 
                                                 
1 Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School, Director UW European Union Center, Co-director UW Center on 
World Affairs and the Global Economy (WAGE).  
2 The author’s focus on these three issues results from information provided in over one hundred interviews with key 
participants in, and observers of, the WTO dispute settlement system in Geneva, Switzerland, as well as in a number 
of national capitals. Those interviewed include representatives from over forty developed and developing country 
missions to the WTO, private lawyers and trade association representatives, over a dozen members of the WTO 
secretariat, six members of the Advisory Centre on WTO Law, and multiple representatives from the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and other Geneva-based organizations. This information is still 
being processed. The author is preparing with other collaborators a survey of all WTO missions that will result in 
new data concerning their relative capacity to mobilize resources for WTO dispute settlement.   
3 In 1994, a Ministerial Decision sought a full review of the DSU by January 1, 1999.  The DSB began informal 
"special sessions" in late 1997.  After the DSB failed to reach consensus, the deadline was extended to July 1, 1999, 
but there was still no agreement at this time.  (See WTO, "Understanding the WTO - The Doha Agenda," available 




dispute settlement rules themselves, such as the system’s weak remedies which reduce the 
benefits of participation, nor does it address the impact of WTO jurisprudence on the costs of 
participation. These issues will be addressed in a separate study.4
In light of resource constraints, developing countries will obviously choose to dedicate 
more resources to other trade-related development initiatives than to WTO dispute settlement. 
Yet if the legal system is to work for them, they will need to examine cost-effective means to 
deploy it. While developing countries, and especially smaller ones, may not trade the volume or 
variety of products as large members, the trade barriers that they confront can often be of greater 
relative importance to their economies. That is, while they may have low absolute stakes in the 
trading system in relation to total world trade, they can have higher relative stakes in relation to 
their particular economies.5 There is thus a need to examine strategies for them to make better 
use of the current system 
 
 1. The Challenge of Internal Capacity: The Need for Bureaucratic and Public-Private 
Network Coordination. In order for a WTO member to use the WTO system successfully, it must 
develop cost-effective mechanisms to perceive injuries to its trading prospects, identify who is 
responsible, and mobilize resources to bring a legal claim or negotiate a favorable settlement. In 
the domestic socio-legal literature, these stages of dispute resolution are referred to as “naming, 
blaming and claiming.”6 In the WTO context, a member’s participation in the system will be, in 
part, a function of its ability to process knowledge of trade injuries, their causes, and their 
relation to WTO rights. Hiring lawyers to defend WTO claims is of little help if countries lack 
cost-effective mechanisms to identify and prioritize claims in the first place. Even where 
countries become aware of actionable injuries, this awareness will not be transformed into legal 
claims if, based on experience, officials lack confidence that a claim is worth pursuing in light of 
high litigation costs, weak remedies, and political risks. 
                                                                                                                                                             
2001, members agreed to continue the special session negotiations until May 2003.  (See Doha Ministerial 
Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, adopted Nov. 14, 2001, para. 30.)  This deadline was later extended to May 2004 
by the General Council after the DSB acknowledged on July 24, 2003, that it needed more time to complete the 
DSU review.  (See WTO, Dispute Settlement Gateway, at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm#dsb.) Yet, the deadline was extended once again on June 
21, 2004, although no target date was set this time.  (Dispute Settlement Body, Special Session of the Dispute 
Settlement Body, Report by the Chairman, Ambassador David Spencer, to the Trade Negotiations Committee, June 
21, 2004.)  As of 2005, negotiation of a new DSU still continues, since the special session is outside Doha's "Single 
Undertaking," which mandated the conclusion of all negotiations by Jan. 1, 2005.  (See, e.g., "DSU Review: 
Members Discuss Two New Contributions," Bridges Weekly Trade Digest, Vol. 9(7), March 2, 2005, available at: 
http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/05-03-02/story6.htm. See also “DSU Talks to Run Parallel to Doha Round to Provide 
More Momentum, Inside U.S. Trade 12 (March 18, 2005)). 
4 For a preliminary examination of the costs of WTO litigation in relation to its benefits, as well as a presentation of 
ideas of how WTO remedies could be modified in order to create incentives for greater developing country use of 
the system, see Gregory Shaffer, “How to Make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work for Developing 
Countries: Some Proactive Developing Country Strategies” (ICTSD, Geneva) 1-65 (March 2003), at 
http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsd_series/resource_papers/DSU_2003.pdf.   
5 For a development of this point, see id.  
6 See William Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming and Claiming, 15 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631 (1980-81). 
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 The United States and EC have developed formal and informal legal mechanisms to 
identify foreign trade barriers, to prioritize them according to their impact, and to mobilize 
resources for WTO complaints.7 They have mobilized resources through interagency 
coordination and networking with the private sector, which, in turn, has engaged private law 
firms. Although many of the larger developing countries have taken significant steps in this 
direction, all developing countries face considerable internal bureaucratic hurdles. These hurdles 
include a bureaucratic tradition of foreign affairs ministries assuming the lead on trade dispute 
matters in which they have limited background; a lack of support from home capitals; a lack of 
financial and informational support from the private sector; a lack of legal expertise; and 
language barriers.8
 In contrast to the United States and EC, developing countries have traditionally tended to 
assign a lower importance to trade matters within governmental hierarchies.9 While the United 
States Trade Representative (USTR) and the EC Trade Commissioner hold cabinet level 
positions, most developing countries do not assign a cabinet position for international trade 
matters. As a result, many developing countries still have a single diplomatic mission for 
handling matters before the WTO and the United Nations (UN) in Geneva. The mission is led by 
an official from the foreign affairs ministry since, generally, individuals from that ministry alone 
may hold the rank of ambassador. Even where a country has created a separate “head of mission” 
for WTO matters from a department that specializes in trade, such individual generally holds a 
lower level position in the government hierarchy.  
 This organizational choice does not mean that trade is invariably given little importance 
within the foreign ministry. For example, Brazil’s past two ambassadors to the WTO (Celso 
Lafer and Celso de Amorim) became the country’s foreign minister immediately following their 
Geneva posting. These assignments have provided Brazil’s mission in Geneva with key support 
in the capital. In many cases, however, the assignment of WTO representation to the foreign 
affairs ministry indicates that WTO matters are viewed as traditional diplomatic ones, involving 
a traditional rotation of personnel to different geographic locations to handle different subject 
matter as part of a broad-based career path.  
 Studies of representation in international organizations have found that, “besides the 
representatives from the key member states [such as the US], the attribute most widely shared 
among the more influential actors in ... international organizations... was long association with 
the organization.”10 Yet the career advancement of most developing country representatives in 
Geneva does not depend on their competence in technical WTO matters, and importantly for our 
purposes, in trade dispute settlement. Trade dispute settlement is incredibly time-consuming, and 
 
7 See Gregory Shaffer, Defending Interests: Public-Private Partnerships in WTO Litigation (2003). 
8 Similarly, in their review of the Argentine system, two Argentine scholars conclude: “In terms of domestic 
institutional setting, the lack of clear and pre-established mechanisms to handle disputes is detrimental to all actors. 
One feasible cost-effective solution would be to reallocate public officials to create a permanent and 
multidisciplinary corps of experts to handle trade disputes.” Diana Tussie and Valentina Tussie, “The Political 
Economy of Dispute Settlement: A Case from Argentina” 13 (August 2004) (paper on file with author). 
9 Interviews in Geneva with a wide range of developing country delegates.  
 
10 Robert Cox and Harold Jacobson, The Anatomy of Influence: Decision-Making in International Organizations 




                                                
as noted by two South American analysts, “out of the range of those who decide promotions 
within the Ministry [of Foreign Affairs].”11 Diplomatic success traditionally is not measured in 
terms of successful international litigation. Moreover, as a result of the diplomatic rotation 
system, a country’s WTO unit in Geneva can suffer from a severe lack of continuity. By the time 
a replacement becomes versed in WTO matters, the delegate will move onto an unrelated post.12 
These career incentives undermine a country’s defense of its trading interests. These bureaucratic 
traditions can be difficult to change, especially where high level officials in the country’s foreign 
ministry would feel threatened by change.  
 Developing country missions, in addition, suffer from a lack of support from national 
capitals. In light of the considerable complexity of WTO rules and of the WTO institutional 
structure, a developing country delegate cannot possibly follow all WTO developments. It has 
been estimated that there are over seventy different WTO councils, committees, working parties, 
and other groupings, involving over 2,800 meetings each year.13 Unlike the US and EC, most 
developing countries cannot afford to fly in officials from the capital for specific WTO meetings. 
Developing country delegates often receive little support at all. One former delegate of a 
developing country confirmed, “During the entire duration of the Uruguay round, our Geneva-
based WTO team received two instructions from our capital.”14 Interviewed developing country 
diplomats generally admit that they would benefit from much greater organizational support 
from home.  
 The lack of bureaucratic coordination on trade matters can undermine Geneva-based 
representatives who might otherwise be more active in dispute settlement. Many developing 
countries require the approval of the attorney general’s office in order to file a claim or a third 
party submission in a WTO case. This process can involve a complex exchange of formal letters 
between multiple ministries in the home country. These ministries can be subject to external 
 
11 Diana Tussie and Valentina Tussie, “The Political Economy of Dispute Settlement: A Case from Argentina” 9 
(August 2004) (paper on file with author). 
12 This tendency was repeatedly confirmed to the author in interviews with developing country representatives. 
13 See Gary Sampson, Trade, Environment and the WTO: The Post-Seattle Agenda 24 (2000). As Sampson, the 
former Director of the WTO’s Trade and Environment Division, notes, the Egyptian delegation to the WTO has 
estimated that there were 2,847 meetings in the WTO in 1997, or an average of 10 meetings per working day. (citing 
Communication from Egypt, High Level Symposium on Trade and Development, mimeo WTO 17 March 1997). Id. 
at 30. In consequence, many countries’ representatives simply do not attend or keep up with developments in most 
WTO committees. Developing countries may lack the capacity to attend meetings in Geneva scheduled for their 
express benefit. As reported by a WTO official interviewed by Braithwaite and Drahos, “We set up a Subcommittee 
with a Chair and a Secretary who turned up for the first meeting on trade needs of LDCs [least developed countries]. 
No LDCs came. No developed countries came. No one came. Not one country showed up. If it had been telecoms, 
the chamber would have been packed [with special interests and states pushed by telecom interests].” John 
Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation 196 (2000). Many WTO members do not even maintain 
permanent offices in Geneva because of a lack of resources, and others have a staff of only a few people for all 
WTO and Geneva-based UN matters. As of May 2004, twenty-four WTO members and nine WTO observers did not 
have permanent missions in Geneva. See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/genwk_e.htm (visited May 
10, 2005). See also “WTO organizes Geneva Week for non-resident delegations,” 43 WTO Focus 16 (Nov. 1999) 
(noting that twenty-eight did not have offices in Geneva in November 1999). 
14 Cited in Michel Kostecki, Technical Assistance Services in Trade-Policy, ICTSD Resource Paper No. 2 (Nov. 
2001), at 9. 
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pressure, especially when the United States or EC is a party to a dispute. Such pressure, even if it 
does not induce a developing country to refrain from joining a complaint, can create so much 
delay that the Geneva-based official is unable to participate effectively. By the time the Geneva-
based representative receives the requisite government approval for the country to participate as 
a party or third party, the deadline for submissions may have passed. As a consultant who 
assisted sub-Saharan African countries notes:  
 
“In most developing countries, particularly those in Africa, all government litigation has 
to be authorized or undertaken by the offices of the Attorney General (this is functionally 
more analogous to the US Solicitor General than the Attorney General). Without such 
clearance, no proceedings can commence. Typically therefore there has to be a complex 
exchange of letters (literally) between the Ministry of Trade (Geneva office sends this to 
the Minister in Capital who then endorses and sends to), the Attorney General’s office, 
(that then has to liaise with) the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (for consistency with foreign 
policy).... The result is that there is extreme delay in delivering instructions to Geneva to 
proceed, which often is after the deadline.” 15   
 
Because of lack of support from home, Geneva-based representatives may become discouraged, 
reducing their incentive to participate in the dispute settlement system. If a major trade dispute 
subsequently arises in which the country is on the defensive, the mission may be utterly lacking 
in dispute settlement experience.  
 
 Many developing country missions suffer from a lack of national legal expertise in WTO 
matters, both within government and in the private bar. Diplomatic postings have generally been 
filled by non-lawyers.16 Most developing countries have only one or two lawyers (if any) to 
address WTO matters, whether in Geneva or in the home capital.  As a representative from a 
Southeast Asian member stated, “I am the only lawyer here. I handle all DSU matters, as well as 
matters before other WTO committees.”17 There may, moreover, be few (or no) private lawyers 
in the country knowledgeable about WTO law. WTO law, as opposed to traditional “public 
international law,” has not traditionally been taught in developing countries, although this is 
changing in some countries. Many developing countries have, as a result, become dependent on 
education at law schools in the United States and Europe to develop local talent, provided that 
talent returns home.18  
 
15 E-mail from an individual who had provided assistance in such a case, Jan. 21, 2003. 
16 Of course, there are situations where non-lawyers master WTO legal matters, as is the case with the head of 
Brazil’s unit for WTO dispute settlement. However, it is unlikely that this situation is common. 
17 DSU refers to the WTO “Dispute Settlement Understanding.” Interview with official, in Geneva, Switz. (Sept. 
2002). 





                                                
 Finally, most developing country officials must work in a foreign language in WTO 
judicial proceedings within this “Anglophone organization.”19 Although English, French and 
Spanish are the three official languages of the WTO, English predominates. Even French and 
Spanish-speaking delegates are at a linguistic disadvantage. As an Argentine representative 
relates: “it is tiring and time consuming to wait for the translation in panel audiences. But also 
and perhaps more relevant, is that translation of documents may take 10 days and so it happens 
that panelists arrive to audiences without having had time to read them. This may be a 
disadvantage vis-á-vis documents submitted by the other part. Panelists have no clue of what our 
arguments are while they know the others’, and this is a great disadvantage.”20 The authors of an 
Argentine case study also note the value of English at panel hearings: “Sessions could be held in 
any official language, but after the initial presentations in Spanish led to yawning and dozing off 
by one member of the panel, a decision was taken to continue in English.”21 Delegates speaking 
other languages are even worse off. To participate effectively, Thais, Malays and Indonesians, to 
give just three examples, would need to master the legal nuances of multiple three-hundred page 
WTO judicial decisions, often with limited legal training, and to do so in a foreign tongue.  
 Yet developing countries need to start somewhere. First, they can try to adapt from 
models used by larger developing countries for WTO dispute settlement, such as Brazil, which, 
in turn, have learned from US and EC models.  As the United States, EC, and Brazil, developing 
countries can reorganize and better coordinate their ministries to target more resources at 
opening foreign markets for their exports. Some developing countries have created specialized 
trade bureaucracies or created specialized dispute settlement units within the foreign ministry. 
Some have attempted to adapt career paths to ensure greater continuity in WTO representation. 
A number of countries have included lawyers in their delegations. Many have developed closer 
relations with the private export sector. Brazil is arguably the most advanced developing country 
in this respect, having developed what it terms a “three pillar” structure involving a special WTO 
dispute settlement division in its capital Brasilia, coordination on WTO legal matters between 
Brazil’s Geneva mission and this unit, and organized relations with the private sector. As part of 
this third pillar, the Brazilian government has helped facilitate the training of young attorneys in 
Brazilian law firms in WTO dispute settlement in the hope that they can help supplement 
constrained governmental resources.22 As one Brazilian representative notes, through creating 
 
19 Interview with Esperanza Duran, Director of the Agency for International Trade Information and Cooperation 
(AITIC), in Geneva, Switz. (June 20, 2002). AITIC works with least developed organizations from Francophone 
Africa. 
20 Interview cited in Tussie and Delich, “The Political Economy of Dispute Settlement: A Case from Argentina,” at 
10-11 supra note…  
21 Id., at 10. 
22 Interviews with Brazilian officials and private sector representatives in Sao Paulo, Brasilia, and Geneva, April and 
June 2004, as part of a project on the Brazilian model for WTO dispute settlement. Confirmed in presentation of Mr. 





                                                
internships in Brazil’s mission in Geneva, “we are trying to spread knowledge of the system in 
order to create a critical mass.”23
 Second, developing countries could obtain more technical assistance from development 
agencies and foundations regarding opportunities for them to exercise their WTO rights. The 
WTO, UNCTAD, and the Advisory Centre on WTO Law are now providing training programs 
in WTO dispute settlement, which many officials have attended.24 Training in dispute settlement 
rules, however, is not sufficient. A central part of any dispute settlement process is the 
identification of potential legal claims–naming and blaming. As Hoekman and Kostecki write 
regarding WTO dispute settlement, “The Advisory Centre on WTO Law focuses only on the 
‘downstream’ dimension of enforcement, not on the ‘upstream’ collection of information.”25 The 
European Commission realized that it lacked such information after the WTO system was 
established in 1995. It hired consultants to identify and report on sectoral trade barriers, which 
reports spurred a number of successful WTO complaints.26 Developing countries could request 
assistance from development agencies and foundations to help them identify trade barriers, 
broken down on a sectoral basis. UNCTAD and the World Bank jointly developed a software 
program named SMART (Software for Market Analysis and Restrictions on Trade) as a tool to 
assist developing countries during the Uruguay Round negotiations. The software permits 
countries to run a simulation of the trade effects of trade barriers so as to inform their negotiating 
strategies.27 Similar systems could be developed for the purpose of WTO monitoring and 
enforcement. Hoekman has proposed that an “independent Special Prosecutor or Advocate” be 
mandated “to identify potential WTO violations on behalf of developing countries,” which he 
terms an “outsourcing of discovery.” Such a move would address “both the resource constraints 
 
23 Discussion with Brazil representative, Feb. 1, 2005, Geneva. 
24 On the WTO’s program, see Gregory Shaffer, “Can WTO Technical Assistance Serve Developing Countries,” in 
Preparing the Doha Development Round: Challenges to the Legitimacy and Efficiency of the World Trading System, 
ed. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (Oxford University Press forthcoming 2005). On the Advisory Centre on WTO Law 
(ACWL) program, see its web site at http://www.acwl.ch/e/training/training_e.aspx (last visited May 10, 2005) 
(noting its six-month lunch-time training sessions on WTO dispute settlement procedures and jurisprudence for 
Geneva-based government officials from developing countries; and a new program for three nine-month internships 
for officials from least developed and other eligible ACWL members to join the ACWL staff as trainees). The fist 
two interns will be from Lesotho and Pargaguay. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) has also created a program for WTO dispute settlement training. See Daniel Pruzin, “U.N. Agency 
Outlines Proposal for WTO Dispute Settlement Training,” 17 International Trade Reporter (BNA) 196 (Feb. 3, 
2000). The above was confirmed in interviews with the Director of the ACWL and developing country delegations 
to the WTO in Geneva, July 2005. 
25 Hoeckman B. and M. Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading System: the WTO and Beyond, (2nd 
edition), (Oxford University Press: 2001) pp. 94-95 (also noting that “One option to deal with the information 
problem is for the private sector to cooperate and to create mechanisms through which data on trade... barriers are 
collected and analyzed”).  
26 See Shaffer, Defending Interests, supra note _. 
27 The software has been installed in a large number of developing countries. It has been incorporated into 
UNCTAD’s TRAINS system (Trade Analysis and Information System). See http://r0.unctad.org/trains/. Compare  





                                                
and the incentive problems (fear of cross-issue linkage) that may impede developing country 
governments from pursuing cases.”28 These mechanisms could build on, and feed into, WTO 
reviews of countries’ compliance with obligations under the Trade Policy Review Mechanism 
and through WTO oversight committees. They also could be developed on a regional basis 
through regional trade associations, possibly with the financial assistance of regional 
development organizations.  
 Such information, however, will only be of use if there is bottom-up demand for them. As 
Stephen Denning writes, “Organizations that focus completely on collecting information with 
little or no effort to foster people connections end up with repositories of dead documents.”29 
Thus, most importantly, developing countries need to develop routinized relations with the 
private sector to identify trade barriers and investigate and prioritize them.  
The private sector in developing countries, however, has typically viewed WTO dispute 
settlement as the government’s job. This perspective can pose a serious problem for developing 
country trade officials who have fewer public resources than their US and EC counterparts, 
counterparts who have already developed mechanisms to work with their own private sectors.30 
Developing country officials could strive to foster the development of a reflex within their export 
sectors to assist them in investigating claims and building factual and legal cases, just as the EC 
did following the WTO’s creation.31 Developing countries would then have better access to the 
information necessary to enforce their trading rights through the dispute settlement system and 
through favorable settlement in its shadow. As Tussie and Delich conclude regarding their 
review of Argentina’s work with the private sector in dispute settlement, “It would have been 
impossible to do the groundwork for the case [which involved Chilean duties on vegetable oils] 
without the provision of factual information, statistical data and financial collaboration from 
business.”32 The development of public-private networks for trade litigation represents a more 
market-based instrument for challenging trade barriers, yet one that government action can 
facilitate.33 Because private enterprises do not necessarily have the same interests as the 
government, public authorities will need to channel and steer these private resources toward 
public ends. Yet unless developing country public-private networks are formed, the resources 
may not be made available in the first place. 
 
 
28 See Bernard Hoekman, “Strengthening the Global Trade Architecture for Development,” 1:1 World Trade 
Review, 1, 36 (2002). 
29 Stephen Denning, “Technical Cooperation and Knowledge Networks,” in eds. Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, Carlos Lopes 
and Khalid Malik, Capacity for Development: New Solutions to Old Problems (Stylus: 2002), p. 242. 
30 See Shaffer, Defending Interests, supra note __. 
31 See Shaffer, Defending Interests, supra note __ at 115 (citing Alistair Stewart, head of the Commission’s market 
access unit: “the Commission would like a new reflex to be developed on [business’s] part, and considers that this 
would be very much in their interest”). 
 
32 Diana Tussie and Valentina Tussie, “The Political Economy of Dispute Settlement: A Case from Argentina” 13 
(August 2004) (paper on file with author). 
33 Compare US and EC governmental action to facilitate the development of public-private networks, in Shaffer, 
Defending Interests, supra note…, including at 113-117. 
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 2. The Financial Challenge: Subsidized Legal Assistance; Private Sector Support; 
Pooling Resources through Regional and International Legal Centers. A second major challenge 
that developing countries face is that they have fewer resources to spend on legal assistance to 
defend their WTO rights. Their government budgets are constrained, often compounded by debt 
obligations, and there are high opportunity costs to investing in WTO litigation as opposed to 
other social needs.  
Compared to larger, wealthier members, developing countries face much higher relative 
and absolute costs in WTO litigation. First, the relative costs of litigation are much higher for 
them in relation to the size of their economies and government budgets. Investing in WTO legal 
expertise thus makes less sense for them in relation to other budgetary needs. Second, developing 
countries face higher absolute costs for an individual case. Since most developing countries 
participate less frequently in WTO dispute settlement, they do not benefit from economies of 
scale. The US and EC, for example, have respectively participated as a party or third party in 
around 98% and 86% of WTO cases that resulted in an adopted decision.34 Because of their prior 
and ongoing litigation experience, the US and EC face fewer start-up costs for an individual 
case. Put in other words, the US and EC can spread the “fixed costs” of developing internal legal 
expertise over more cases than developing countries. For a particular case, the US and EC 
expend primarily only the “variable costs” of preparation and litigation of that case. It is thus less 
cost-effective for developing countries to develop significant internal legal expertise to handle 
WTO complaints. 
Developing countries’ best alternative is thus either to work with private law firms, 
possibly funded by private enterprises, or with a subsidized legal services organization that is 
autonomous of the WTO, such as the Advisory Centre on WTO Law. Both private law firms and 
legal service organizations are more likely to be repeat players, representing multiple parties in 
WTO litigation over time. Private law firms and subsidized legal services organizations are thus 
able to develop legal expertise in a more cost-effective manner which they can deploy for a 
particular case. 
Another alternative would be for the WTO secretariat or an independent organization to 
act as a public prosecutor, similar to the role that the European Commission assumes before the 
European Court of Justice within the EC’s legal system. This alternative would expand on 
Hoekman’s proposal, since the “special prosecutor” would not only identify claims but also 
litigate them, as done in the EC. However, this alternative appears to be politically infeasible at 
this time, especially in terms of actual litigation by a special prosecutor, because of challenges to 
WTO legitimacy (especially were the prosecutor linked to the WTO secretariat) and because the 
most powerful WTO members would not support it. Thus, the only alternatives appear to be 
subsidized legal assistance and use of private law firms.35  
                                                 
34 This calculation is based on an update of Tables 6.1 and 7.1 of Shaffer, Defending Interests,  supra note…, at 132 
and 157 (noting 97% and 81% participation rates as of January 17, 2003).  
35 A complementary mechanism would be to reform remedies to provide for attorney fee awards or cash damages 
that would create incentives for entrepreneurial private law firms, but this would involve a change in DSU rules. 
Alternatively, WTO procedures could be simplified to reduce the costs of participation. Some mechanisms exist 
under the current system, but are not deployed. See Hakan Nordstrom, “The cost of WTO litigation, legal aid and 
small claim procedures” (March 2005 discussion paper on file with author) (noting articles 5 and 25 of  the DSU on 




                                                                                                                                                            
 In many cases, private companies and trade associations can pay for a private law firm 
that will work with the government in preparing a WTO case. Some larger developing countries 
have worked with the private sector to hire private law firms to assist in the bringing of 
complaints. Brazil worked with Sidley Austin Brown & Wood for the cotton and sugar subsidies 
cases against the United States and EC. Thailand hired Lalive & Partners in the US-shrimp-turtle 
case. Korea hired Marco Bronkers, now with Wilmer Cutler & Pickering, in the Korea-alcohol 
case. Some smaller countries have followed suit, such as the Caribbean country of Antigua and 
Barbuda in its challenge to U.S. internet gambling restrictions, in which private lawyers from 
firms based in the United States and United Kingdom were hired by private companies to help 
represent the island nation.36 U.S. and European law firms actively promote their skills in 
Geneva, and are often seen in the WTO building for hearings or simply to make contact with 
former or potential clients.  
 Developing countries also have the opportunity to obtain partially subsidized legal 
assistance through the Advisory Centre on WTO Law in Geneva, an international legal services 
organization.37 The Agreement establishing the Advisory Centre on WTO Law was signed by 
twenty-nine countries on December 1, 1999 at the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Seattle, 
Washington, and it entered into force on July 15, 2001. With Costa Rica’s plan to join the 
Advisory Centre in 2005, all developing countries and customs territories that have participated 
in WTO “proceedings [as a complainant or respondent] more than twice and fewer than 18 times 
will have joined the Centre.”38 The Centre is funded largely by European governments, although 
developing country members (other than the least developed countries) must also pay a 
membership fee that is determined in relation to their per capita income and share of world 
trade.39 In May 2005, the Centre consisted of eight lawyers, under the executive directorship of 
Frieder Roessler, former head of the legal affairs division of the GATT secretariat.  
 
April 1966 (BISD 14S/18) for developing country complaints against developed countries, but the procedures only 
reduce the time for panel decisions in a situation where developing countries already have difficulty meeting time 
constraints).  
36 See Daniel Pruzin and Christopher Rugaber, “WTO Publishes Final Decision on Internet Gambling; U.S. to 
Appeal,” International Trade Reporter (BNA) vol 21: 46, at 1874 (Nov. 18, 2004). 
37 See the web site of the Advisory Centre, on WTO Law, Welcome to the Advisory Centre on WTO Law, at 
http://www.acwl.ch/e/index_e.aspx (last visited May 8, 2005).  
38 ACWL, “Cost Rica to Join the Centre,” at http://www.acwl.ch/e/tools/news_detailsphoto_e.aspx?id=5b5103c5-
53af-4273-a95e-1d0e75d003ec (visited May 10, 2005). 
39  See Advisory Ctr. WTO Law, Report on Operations: July 2001-June 2002 available at www.acwl.ch), at 8. 
Because of the membership fee, a developing country (other than a least developed country) may wait to join the 
Centre until it believes that it can benefit meaningfully from WTO litigation. The United States is not a member of 
the Centre and provides no funding for this initiative. Canada is the only non-European developed country member 
of the Centre. The other nine are Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and 
the United Kingdom. The term “least developed country” is clearly defined according to United Nations criteria 
based on per capita income and related development indicators. The criteria used in the triennial review in 2003 
were based on domestic gross domestic product (under $900 average over three years), a human resource weakness 
index and an economic vulnerability index. See UN, “The Criteria for the Identification of the LDCs,” at 
http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ldc/ldc%20criteria.htm (last visited May 8, 2005). There were fifty countries 
listed as LDCs, as of May 8, 2005. Id.  
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 The Advisory Centre is designed to counsel and represent developing countries so that 
they may defend their WTO rights at less-than-market rates that vary depending on the country’s 
membership status, share of world trade, and per capita income.40 By May 2005, the Advisory 
Centre had represented eight developing countries (Ecuador, Honduras, India, Indonesia, 
Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, and Thailand) in twelve WTO cases, in addition to assisting countries 
in the “consultation phase” of disputes and providing consulting advice in respect of potential 
claims.41 As a repeat player in WTO litigation, the Advisory Centre can provide legal services to 
developing countries in a manner somewhat analogous to the way in which the European 
Commission’s Legal Services assists EC member states in WTO litigation. By pooling their 
resources, European countries have enhanced their voice and collective knowledge of WTO law 
in a cost-effective manner.42 Small European countries, such as Portugal and Ireland and now 
most Eastern European countries, may rely on the Commission as a repeat player in WTO 
litigation. They are thereby able to participate more effectively in the defense of their interests 
and in the overall shaping of WTO law through the judicial process. The Advisory Centre, 
although it will operate in a more ad hoc manner for developing countries, can similarly develop 
a reservoir of WTO expertise into which developing countries can tap. It can thus more 
effectively provide developing country input into the judicial construction of the law over time. 
 Developing countries could use the Advisory Centre in different ways, depending on 
their level of development and the frequency with which they participate in WTO disputes. 
Larger, more active countries, such as India, may use the Centre to develop their own national 
expertise in WTO dispute settlement.43 Smaller countries that rarely engage in WTO disputes 
may find it less cost-effective to develop their own legal expertise and thus almost solely rely on 
the Centre, as did Peru in its case against the EC concerning whether its fish species could be 
sold in the EC as sardines.44 Yet even larger developing countries, such as India, will find that 
 
40 Under the annexes to the agreement establishing the Centre, developing countries are divided into three 
categories, A, B and C, with least developed countries (as defined by UN rules) constituting a fourth category. As of 
August 2002, hourly rates for the Centre’s members for WTO litigation support were set at $200 for category A 
countries, $150 for category B countries and $100 for category C countries. Least developed countries hourly rates 
are set at $25. Non-member developing country rates are set at $350 for category A countries, $300 for category B 
countries, and $250 for category C countries.  See The Agreement Establishing the Advisory Centre on WTO Law, 
Annex II, Nov. 13, 1999, available at http://www.acwl.ch/Docs/ACWLAgreementEnglish.htm.  
41  See listing at http://www.acwl.ch/e/dispute/wto_e.aspx. See also e-mail from the Advisory Centre in November 
2004 (on file). The first seven cases involved India (three cases), Pakistan, Peru, and Ecuador. Ecuador’s case 
against Turkey was settled. See Report on Operations, supra note _, at 81-84. 
42 Most WTO expertise in Europe now resides within the European Commission, and not in individual member state 
trade administrations. See Shaffer, Defending Interests, supra note _. 
 
43 The Centre is also provides internship possibilities and organizes weekly and other periodic seminars for 
developing country officials. See http://www.acwl.ch/e/training/training_e.aspx.  
44 Interview with Peruvian official, in Geneva, Switz. (June 21, 2002). See Gregory Shaffer & Victor Mosoti, “EC-




                                                                                                                                                            
the Advisory Centre can provide an important complement to their domestic resources. Just as 
the EC has sometimes farmed out WTO cases to private law firms, and just as the USTR and the 
EC have collaborated with private counsel hired by private firms, so the Centre can be of 
assistance to even the most sophisticated developing country trade administration. In addition, 
private enterprises could (indirectly) pay the Centre’s fees or hire a law firm to work with the 
Centre’s lawyers. Such collaboration occurred in the WTO case involving EC export subsidies 
for sugar, when a U.S. law firm represented Brazil and the Centre represented Thailand as a co-
complainant.45 The Centre, as all participants in WTO litigation, has encountered major 
challenges in light of WTO jurisprudential developments that require intensive fact-gathering 
and rely less on presumptions and references to general principles.46 Yet the Centre is better able 
to adapt to WTO jurisprudence than individual developing countries.  
 The Advisory Centre could also assist groups of like-minded developing countries in 
preparing third party submissions in WTO disputes to defend their systemic interests. In light of 
the weakness of the current WTO political system and the resulting importance of individual 
WTO cases for the interpretation of WTO law, developing countries should consider organizing 
on a more consistent basis to present their views as third parties. Only the United States and EC 
participate routinely as third parties in cases where they are not a plaintiff or defendant.47 They 
do so especially before the Appellate Body where participation has the greatest systemic impact. 
By preparing joint third party submissions, the Advisory Centre could place dispute settlement 
panels and the Appellate Body on notice of the views of organized groups of developing 
countries in individual cases. Yet the Advisory Centre has never represented a group of 
developing countries as third parties.48
 In addition, developing countries may wish to seek funding for legal support centers in 
Washington and Brussels to complement the Advisory Centre. Much of the legal action for 
market access takes place before U.S. and EC administrative bodies, in particular in 
antidumping, subsidy, and safeguard cases. These cases can be extremely expensive, so 
expensive that many developing country enterprises simply cease exporting to the United States 
or Europe upon the initiation of a complaint. Statistical evidence reveals that lower income 
developing countries fare far worse in U.S. antidumping proceedings than do developed country 
defendants. They “are more likely to be targeted, less likely to settle cases, more likely to 
confront high dumping duties and less likely to bring cases to the WTO.”49 Developing a legal 
 
“delegates of Peru have attended the lunch-time [ACWL] training sessions in all three years.” The author thanks an 
anonymous referee for this point.  
45 Discussion with member of the Advisory Centre, November 2004. 
46 See e.g., US-Rules of Origin for Textiles and Apparel Products, in which the Centre unsuccessfully represented 
India. Some governments may retain private counsel themselves, instead of the Advisory Centre, in light of their 
determination of the case’s relative importance, private counsel’s reputation and cost-effectiveness, and the 
country’s past experience. Interview with delegates from Brazil and Chile, among other WTO missions, Geneva, 
June 2003 and 2004. 
 
47 Japan has also been a frequent third party. See Shaffer, Defending Interests, supra note…, at 157. 
48 Confirmed by Leo Palme of the Advisory Centre, Feb. 1, 2005. 
49 See Chad Bown, Bernard Bernard Hoekman & Caglar Ozden, “The Pattern of US Antidumping: The Path from 
Initial Filing to WTO Dispute.” 2:3 World Trade Review 349-371 (November 2003). 
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resource center in Washington and Brussels to provide developing countries with partially 
subsidized legal support may be difficult, but that does not detract from its importance. One 
possibility could be to tie such a center to a law school, similar to the way in which the Center 
for International Environmental Law (CIEL) “directs a joint research and teaching program with 
the American University Washington College of Law” in Washington D.C.. As CIEL’s web site 
note, the program includes “on-the-job experience through an extensive internship program… 
[whose] participants are drawn from the Washington College of Law’s Master of Laws program 
which each year enrolls 180 foreign lawyers from 60 countries from around the world.”50 This 
initiative could be easier to accomplish in the United States in light of US law schools’ 
experience with clinical programs that provide course credit, although analogous mechanisms 
could be explored in Brussels.  
 WTO cases increasingly involve challenges to U.S. and EC trade remedy procedures.51 In 
mid-2004, trade remedy cases comprised slightly over one-half of the twenty-three active panel 
and Appellate Body proceedings.52  The U.S. and EC were respectively the two major targets. In 
these cases, the Appellate Body has sometimes refrained from finding that U.S. and European 
import relief laws themselves violate WTO obligations, and rather held against U.S. and 
European administrative practices.53 Developing countries must thus develop a factual and legal 
record in the U.S. and EC domestic proceeding if they are to successfully pursue a matter before 
the WTO.  
 Parties also need to ensure that U.S. and European administrative bodies take account of 
WTO jurisprudence in applying domestic law. Although WTO law has no direct effect in the 
United States or Europe, domestic administrative bodies and courts should take account of WTO 
law in interpreting the relevant domestic statutes on the ground that the statutes were intended to 
implement WTO law. The European Court of Justice has expressly maintained that it will 
interpret EC law to conform, where possible, with EC obligations under WTO agreements.54 
 
50 The quotation is from CIEL’s home page at http://www.ciel.org/reciel.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2005). 
51 From the WTO’s formation through September 2001, WTO members filed eighteen complaints against the United 
States in respect of its antidumping and countervailing duty laws and six additional complaints against U.S. 
application of its import safeguards law. During the first nine months of 2001 alone, WTO members filed seven new 
requests for consultations and panel formations in respect of U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty laws and 
measures. In a three week period at the end of the summer of 2001, WTO panels were formed to hear challenges on 
four separate challenges against U.S. import protection laws and proceedings. See, e.g., “U.S. Peppered with WTO 
Complaints, Criticizes Prior Rulings,” 19 Inside U.S. Trade 6 (Aug. 24, 2001). 
52 See Rossella Brevetti, “Fewer WTO Cases Filed So Far in 2004, Legal Affairs Director Wilson Says,” 
International Trade Reporter (BNA), vol 21: 34, at 1378 (Aug. 19, 2004) (“Wilson said that 53 percent are trade 
remedy cases and 47 percent are non-trade remedy cases”).  
53 See, e.g., Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products 
from the European Communities, WT/DS212/AB/R (Nov. 22, 2002), para. 161 (reversing the panel’s decision that 
certain provisions of U.S. countervailing duty law did not conform with the United States’ obligations under the 
SCM Agreement, but upholding the panel’s decision that the U.S. administrative determinations were made in a 
manner “inconsistent” with the SCM Agreement, and “requesting” the United States to bring its “administrative 
practice... into conformity with its [WTO] obligations”). 




                                                
There is likewise long-standing U.S. Supreme Court precedent that “an Act of Congress ought 
never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains.”55 
This jurisprudence was cited with approval in the U.S. domestic litigation following the 
Appellate Body’s U.S.-shrimp-turtle decision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
overruled the lower court and interpreted the U.S. statute in conformity with the Appellate 
Body’s finding of WTO requirements, after taking note of the WTO case.56 The Federal Circuit 
took a similar position in overruling a lower court in an antidumping case against steel imports in 
2003, citing a WTO decision as support even though noting that it was not bound by WTO 
jurisprudence.57
 Developing countries could also pool their resources through regional centers to assist 
them in defining trade priorities, coordinating negotiating strategies, building public-private 
networks, identifying trade barriers, and (potentially) providing legal support in WTO 
litigation.58 These regional centers could, for example, assist the Advisory Centre in WTO 
litigation. A Trade Law Center has been established in southern Africa and countries have 
explored creating one in Cairo, Egypt as well.59 States within regions face diverse challenges and 
their national interests can conflict, so that the development of regional centers faces significant 
challenges.60 Nonetheless, taking from the European example, countries increasingly realize the 
benefits to be gained from coordinating and pooling their resources.61 The pragmatic challenge 
of pooling resources at the regional level needs to be compared with the alternative of each 
 
55 Murray v Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 188 (1804) (Marshall C.J.) (known as the “Charming 
Betsy” rule). 
56 Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Donald Evans, 284 F.3d 1282, 1289-1290 (2002) (majority). When an 
environmental group challenged the revised U.S. State Department regulations, the U.S. government argued that the 
WTO ruling constituted “the law of nations,” and that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the 
law of nations, if any other possible construction remains.”  See Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Donald Evans, 
284 F.3d 1282, 1303 (2002) (dissent). 
57  See Nippon Steel Corp. v United States, 337 F.3d 1373 (2003) and Allegheny Ludlum Corp. V United States, 367 
F.3d 1339. Compare Appellate Body Report, United States - Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products 
from the European Communities, WT/DS212/AB/R, adopted Jan. 8, 2003. 
 
58 See e.g., Peter Drahos, “When the Weak Bargain with the Strong: Negotiations in the World Trade Organization,” 
8 International Negotiation 79-109 (2003). 
59 See Victor Mosoti, Does Africa Need the WTO Dispute Settlement System?, (ICTSD, Geneva) 1-28 (2003) 
available at http://www.ictsd.org/dlogue/2003-02-07/Mosoti.pdf. ”  
60 See, e.g., Paul-Henri Bischoff, “How Far, Where To? Regionalism, the Southern African Development 
Community and Decision-Making into the Millennium,” in eds. Korwa Gombe & Adar Rok Ajulu (2002), 
Globalization and Emerging Trends in African States’ Foreign Policy-Making Process (Ashgate Pub.) p.299. 
(“However, the durability of national interests and intensification of transnational influences have not helped the 
SADC [Southern African Development Community] as a model of regional organization”). 
61 See e.g. Thomas Catan, “Mercosur seeks to build ties with Mexico,” Financial Times, July 6, 2002 at 2.   
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developing country working on its own, in which case the trading powers can more easily play 
developing countries off of each other.62
 Finally, the Advisory Centre and developing countries could work with academics that 
specialize in WTO law on a consultancy or pro bono basis. National and regional trade law 
advisory centers on trade law could affiliate with universities in developing countries, as has the 
Trade Law Center for Southern Africa (“TRALAC”) with the University of Stellenbosch.63 
Some U.S. legal scholars have already worked on amicus curiae briefs in WTO cases, although 
they have generally sided with the great powers against developing country complainants, as in 
the U.S.-shrimp and EC-sardines cases. Many legal academics, however, might welcome the 
possibility of assisting developing countries on a WTO case.64 Not only would they provide a 
needed public service, but their own scholarship would benefit.  
 Most of the legal scholarship read in Geneva by WTO officials is written by U.S. and 
European scholars who are socialized to think of law from a U.S. or European perspective. As 
critical and constructivist scholars note, these scholars can exercise power in a diffuse, but 
important, way.65 Through their work, they can shape perceptions and the appreciation of 
alternatives. By working with developing countries on international trade cases, academics 
would better learn how the WTO process works in practice. They could write contextualized 
analyses of WTO jurisprudence that are more informed by a developing country perspective.  
  
 3. The Political Challenge: The Need for North-South NGO-Government Alliances. The 
third major challenge is that developing countries will often face extra-legal pressure from 
                                                 
62 See e.g. Peter Drahos, “When the Weak Bargain with the Strong: Negotiations in the World Trade Organization,” 
8 International Negotiation 79-109 (2003). See also Gregory Shaffer and Yvonne Apea, “Institutional Choice in the 
GSP Case: Who Decides the Conditions for Trade Preferences: The Law and Politics of Rights,” Journal of World 
Trade (forthcoming 2005). Developing countries would of course have to monitor and develop trust that the 
secretariats of regional associations and the lead representatives in regional networks work effectively on their 
behalf. 
63 See Mosoti, Does Africa Need the WTO Dispute Settlement System?, supra note _. 
 
64 See e.g., Peter Drahos and Michael Blakeney, Rockefeller Report for Bellagio Conference (2002), cited in 
Reichman, “Managing the Challenge of a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime” (draft for the second Bellagio 
meeting on Intellectual Property and Development 2003) (on file) (proposing the formation of an “Academic 
Resource Group”). 
65 See e.g. Richard Ashley, “The Powers of Anarchy: Theory, Sovereignty and the Domestication of Global Life,” 
reprinted in James der Derian, ed., International Theory: Critical Investigations 101 (1995) (“By contrast, my 
analysis looks to knowledgeable practices as productive relations of power. It looks to the way in which 
knowledgeable practices work in history to control ambiguity, privilege some interpretations over others, limit 
discourse, discipline conduct, and produce subjective agents and the institutional structures of their experience”); 
Ronen Palen, “The Constuctivist Underpinnings of the New International Political Economy, in Palen, ed, Global 
Political Economy: Contemporary Theories 219 (2000) (“knowledge, then, cannot be divorced from interest and the 
social position of the knower”); and Clarissa Rile Hayward, De-Facing Power (Cambridge University Press: 2000) 
(viewing power not in terms of “instruments powerful agents use…., but as social boundaries (such as laws, rules, 





                                                
powerful countries, undermining the goal of objective trade dispute resolution through law.66 The 
powerful can exploit power imbalances and rhetorically rationalize their actions in non-power-
based terms. There may be little that a small developing country can do to counter threats to 
withdraw preferential tariff benefits or foreign aid–even food aid–were the country to challenge a 
trade measure.67 Such political tactics can undermine developing country faith in the efficacy of 
the legal system. The use of such tactics is not surprising. In domestic contractual disputes 
involving firms that exercise market power, these firms also benefit from the use of explicit and 
implicit threats.68 Developing countries can nonetheless better cope with them by adopting more-
effective strategies to attempt to constrain extra-legal pressures. As some recent cases 
demonstrate, developing countries can forge alliances with constituencies within the global 
powers. By harnessing domestic political pressure and legal expertise within the United States 
and Europe, developing countries can curtail, at least somewhat, great power political pressure 
and otherwise offset some of the resource imbalances that they face. 
 An example of a relatively successful north-south alliance is that between developing 
countries and northern-based non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as Doctors Without 
Borders, concerning the recognition, scope, and enforcement of pharmaceutical patent rights. 
Together, they helped counter U.S. pressure on developing countries to enforce U.S. 
pharmaceutical company patents under a strict interpretation of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS Agreement”). First, the United States withdrew 
its threat of initiating a WTO claim against South Africa in response to pressure from AIDS 
activists on Vice President Gore’s presidential campaign.69 Second, in June 2001, the Bush 
 
66 Guzman and Simmons find that statistical evidence concerning the selection of defendants suggests that 
developing country selection is more likely to be explained by capacity factors than power-based ones. See Andrew 
Guzman & Beth Simmons, “Power Plays and Capacity Constraints: The Selection of Defendants in WTO Disputes,” 
Journal of Legal Studies (forthcoming 2005). Nonetheless, this author’s interviews confirmed that smaller 
developing countries frequently face political constraints in initiating a WTO complaint. 
67 Confirmed in a number of interviews, including an interview with a former member of USTR (noting U.S. threat 
to high level officials in the capital of an African country that the U.S. might withdraw food aid were the country’s 
Geneva representatives to press a WTO complaint). Similarly, a trade consultant noted how he was in the office of 
the trade minister of a country in Africa when the minister received a document from the U.S. embassy, which was 
the AGOA trade package. The document was thousands of pages. The trade minister received the document on a 
Friday and was to provide a definitive response by the following Wednesday. The consultant asked the minister 
what would be the consequences if the minister did not reply on Wednesday or said no. The minister responded that 
they were informed that they would lose funding to combat the AIDS epidemic. Telephone discussion, Nov. 29, 
2004.  See also Shaffer and Apea, GSP Case, supra note_. 
68 As Macaulay points out, “under bargaining, winning and losing is not necessarily related to ‘legal’ right or wrong; 
it may be related to the power and resources of the bargainers.” Stewart Macaulay, Lawrence Freidman & John 
Stookey, The Legal System in Operation: Highlighting the Importance of Discretion, Bargaining, and “the Law,” in 
LAW & SOCIETY: READINGS ON THE SOCIAL STUDY OF LAW 160  (Macaulay, Friedman and Stookey, eds., 1995).  
69  See Steven Meyers, South Africa and U.S. End Dispute Over Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1999, at A8 (stating 
that 300 protesters gathered in Philadelphia in June 1999 to chant “Gore’s greed kills!”); and Doug Ireland, “AIDS 
Drugs for Africa,” Nation, Oct. 4, 1999, at 5 (noting ACT UP demonstrators’ chants of “Gore’s greed kills” to 
pressure the administration to change its policies toward South Africa). Vice-President Gore was co-chairman of the 
U.S.-South Africa Bi-national Commission on pharmaceutical issues. Eventually, the U.S. Administration gave in. 
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administration withdrew the United States’ claim against Brazil’s compulsory licensing 
provisions under Brazil’s patent law in the context of widespread protest against the U.S. action 
from advocacy groups who maintained that the U.S. government was placing corporate interests 
above life-and-death medical concerns.70 This NGO pressure was complemented by prodding 
from international health organizations.71 Third, USTR Robert Zoellick abandoned the U.S. 
pharmaceutical industry with little consultation in agreeing to the “Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health” at Doha.72 The United States again backed down just before the 
September 2003 Cancun WTO ministerial meeting concerning the right of developing countries 
without manufacturing capacity to issue compulsory licenses for the importation of generic 
drugs.73 Even though northern activists and developing countries would like to go further in 
modifying and officially interpreting the TRIPS Agreement, they have helped to counter 
aggressive pressure and shifted the terms of debate over the protection of pharmaceutical patents. 
 Similarly, developing countries can work with northern consumer groups in bringing 
WTO claims. In the case EC-Trade Description for Sardines, the UK Consumers’ Association, 
the largest consumers association in Europe and the second largest in the world, worked with a 
UK law firm, Clyde & Co, on a pro bono basis to prepare an amicus curiae brief in support of 
Peru’s submissions to the WTO panel.  In this case, Peru challenged an EC regulation that would 
 
See Gary Yerkey, “President Orders Easing of IPR Policy For Sub-Saharan Africa to Help Fight AIDS,” 17 
International Trade Reporter (BNA) 792 (May 18, 2000).  
 
70   See, e.g., “U.S., Brazil End WTO Case on Patents, Split on Bilateral Process,” 19 Inside U.S. Trade 1, 2 (June 
29, 2001) (“Informed sources said the U.S. backpedaling from the WTO panel, which it had requested in February, 
reflected an unwillingness on the part of U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick to give opponents of trade 
liberalization a red-hot issue that appeared to give credence to the idea of the WTO interfering with poor countries’ 
health policies.”). Doctors Without Borders declared that Brazil’s patent policy was key to the success of the 
Brazil’s strategy to offer universal access to HIV/AIDS medication in Brazil. Brazil’s health program includes free 
distribution of antiretroviral drugs produced in Brazil. This program has allegedly reduced AIDS deaths by 50 
percent since it was introduced and saved the government an estimated $422 million in hospitalization and medical 
care costs. See Daniel Pruzin, “US Responds to Criticisms of Brazilian Patent Law Complaint,” 18 International 
Trade Reporter (BNA) 238 (February 8, 2001). Oxfam, a British NGO, backed Brazil’s efforts, maintaining that the 
U.S. complaint was an assault on public health. See Drug Companies vs. Brazil: The Threat to Public Health, 
available at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/policy/papers/brazilctc/ctcbraz.htm. 
71  For example, 52 countries of a 53 member United Nations Commission endorsed Brazil’s AIDS policy and 
backed a resolution sponsored by Brazil that called on all states to promote access to AIDS drugs. See UN Rights 
Body Backs Brazil on AIDS Drugs, NEWS24.COM, Apr. 24, 2001, available at 
http://www.news24.com/contentDisplay/level4Article/0,1113,2-1134_1014970.00.html. 
72  E-mail from Washington insider (June 27, 2002) (concerning the lack of consultation). See also Gary Yerkey & 
Daniel Pruzin, “Agreement on TRIPS/Public Health Reached at WTO Ministerial in Doha,” 18 International Trade 
Reporter (BNA) 1817 (Nov. 15, 2001) (noting that “representatives with the pharmaceutical industry were less than 
enthusiastic,” and a Swiss officials, also representing pharmaceutical interests, “expressed fury at being excluded”). 
See generally WTO Secretariat, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 
(Nov. 20, 2001) (recognizing a number of “flexibilities” in the TRIPS Agreement). 
73  See Council for TRIPS, Implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 




                                                
not permit Peruvian fish to be sold as “sardines” within the EC, even though they could be sold 
throughout the world as sardines in accordance with an international standard agreed under the 
auspices of the Codex Alimentarius Commission.74 The ten-page brief of the Consumers’ 
Association addressed how the EC regulation “clearly acts against the economic and information 
interests of Europe’s consumers” and constitutes “base protectionism in favour of a particular 
industry within the EU,” the Spanish fishing industry. Thanks to the Consumers’ Association and 
its law firm, Peru and the Advisory Centre on WTO Law received free legal research and 
counsel on such issues as the history and application of the EC regulations and the Codex 
standard-setting procedures,. 
 The Advisory Centre attached the association’s amicus brief to Peru’s legal submission 
and quoted it with approval.75 The brief had an impact on the WTO panel, which cited it 
concerning European consumer views.76 When the EC challenged the panel’s use of the 
Consumers’ Association brief during interim review, the panel confirmed that it justifiably 
considered the brief “in determining whether the European consumers associate the term 
‘sardines’ exclusively with Sardina pilchardus,” the fish variety swimming in European waters. 
The panel then found that European consumers did not associate sardines exclusively with this 
variety, in contradiction of the EC’s position. There was thus no reason that the Peruvian species 
could not be sold as sardines in the EC market. The Appellate Body upheld the panel’s central 
findings in favor of Peru. 
 The Advisory Centre on WTO Law can assist in the forging of these north-south NGO-
government alliances. Since the Centre’s lawyers are repeat players in WTO litigation, and since 
they are based in Geneva, the home of the WTO, they more easily can develop relations with 
northern groups to provide assistance in specific trade matters.77 The Advisory Centre’s general 
policy is to post its legal submissions on the Centre’s web site, facilitating interaction with 
 
74  See Shaffer & Mosoti, EC-Sardines, supra note _, at 15. 
75  For example, Peru referred to the brief in its submission to the panel to point out how a “wide range of tuna or 
bonito species can be marketed in the Community under a common standards regime,” rendering it “difficult to 
understand why sardines should be marked out for a particularly restrictive regulatory regime.” Second Submission 
of Peru, EC–Trade Description of Sardines, WT/DS231 (Jan. 11, 2002), para. 71, available at 
http://www.acwl.ch/pdf/SecondSubmitPeru.pdf .  
76  See Report of the Panel, EC–Trade Description of Sardines, WT/DS231/R (May 29, 2002), paras. 6.13-.15, 
7.131-.132. The panel refused to review letters from other EC consumer organizations that the EC submitted during 
the interim review stage, on the grounds that such stage was too late in the process to introduce new evidence. See 
id. at 6.16. 
77  Largely serendipitously, the Advisory Centre’s director, Mr Roessler, met a senior member of the UK 
Consumers’ Association  at a conference in London concerning international trade law. Following the conference, 
the Consumers’ Association agreed to support Peru’s submissions in the EC-Sardines case. Telephone interview 
with member of the UK Consumer’s Association (Sept. 10, 2002). 
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NGOs, lawyers, academics, and others.78 Some developing country NGOs, such as Consumer 
Unity & Trust Society (CUTS) based in India, are also attempting to help forge north-south 
alliances.79 Oxfam, for example, has been a major supporter of Brazil’s challenges to U.S. and 
European cotton and sugar subsidies.80 As happened for Peru in the sardines case, these alliances 
can help undermine the opposing party’s factual and legal positions. By shaping the normative 
and political contexts in which legal challenges occur, they can also countervail industry pressure 
on executive departments in larger developed countries to take aggressive stances toward 
developing countries in the first place. 
 International negotiations involve a two-level game in which national constituencies 
compete in the formation of national positions and those national positions are then advanced in 
international negotiations.81 If developing countries cannot neutralize the clout of U.S. and 
European firms in the formation of U.S. and European positions, then developing countries will 
more likely face the full brunt of U.S. and European pressure in regards to pharmaceutical 
patents and other WTO claims. In a world of asymmetric power, developing countries enhance 
the prospects of their success if other U.S. and European constituencies can offset industry 
pressure on U.S. and European trade authorities. Developing countries need to work with these 
constituencies to alter the domestic political playing fields of the other side. 
 
4. Conclusion.      
 If developing countries are to participate meaningfully in the WTO dispute settlement 
system, they will need to continue to increase institutional capacity and coordination of trade 
policy at multiple levels, from the national to the regional to the global. They will need, in 
particular, to develop their own coordinative mechanisms to include private sector and civil 
society representatives. Capacity building endeavors generally will be most sustainable if they 
permeate broadly throughout institutions and societies.82  
                                                 
78  Interview with member of the Advisory Centre on WTO law, in Geneva, Switz. (June 18, 2002). The client 
member, however, makes the ultimate decision. See ACWL, Policy on Publication of Submissions during WTO 
Dispute Settlement Proceedings, at http://www.acwl.ch/e/dispute/dispute_e.aspx (visited May 10, 2005). 
79  Confirmed in e-mail from CUTS representative, Sept. 19, 2002. 
 
80 See e.g., Oxfam, “Busted: World Trade Watchdog Declares EU and US Farm Subsidies Illegal” (Sept. 8, 2004) 
available at http://www.maketradefair.com/en/index.php?file=cotton_pr03.htm. 
81  See e.g., Robert Putman, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games,” International 
Organization 427 (1988); and Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Peter B. 
Evans et al., eds., 1993). 
 
82 If the focus of capacity building remains on individual capacity instead of larger societal and institutional 
capacity, then countries could simply be training individuals whose objectives and career paths are unpredictable. 
See Gregory Shaffer, “Can WTO Technical Assistance and Capacity Building Serve Developing Countries?” supra 
note__. Michel Kostecki found in regards to WTO “capacity building” programs, “some of the civil servants 
attending training events were not primarily involved in trade policy-making. In addition, course participants may 
move on to jobs that are not trade-related, or quit the government for the private sector.” See Michel Kostecki, 




                                                
 If developing countries are to deploy WTO law to their advantage, they will need to 
maintain routine on-going procedures for gathering, processing and prioritizing information from 
foreign embassies, the private sector, and international trade consultants regarding foreign trade 
barriers. By working more consistently with the private sector, developing country officials can 
foster the development of reflexes in firms and trade associations to view the WTO as an 
opportunity to ensure market access, thereby more effectively using the WTO system to their 
advantage. Brazil has gone a long way toward institutionalizing this coordination in WTO 
dispute settlement, and Brazil has become a much more active and successful user of the system 
as a result.83 Building requisite developing country public-private networks will take time. Yet it 
is an essential task if the WTO dispute settlement system is to work for them. 
 Many developing countries are learning to use the WTO dispute settlement system more 
effectively. The Advisory Centre, with its growing experience and knowledge of the system, 
represents a significant advance. Private law firms are likewise dedicating more resources to 
WTO dispute settlement into which some developing countries can tap. With time, developing 
countries should be able to gain a greater strategic sense of how to use the dispute settlement 
system and to work with broader networks of public and private actors to advance their concerns. 
They will always be at a significant disadvantage because of material and informational resource 
constraints and political factors that they cannot control. Yet the WTO legal system can also 
offer opportunities for them. 
 Since developing countries face different contexts, there is no single strategy that fits all 
of them. Exporting legal strategies across cultures regardless of context has never worked.84 
Each country will need to determine how best to adapt the strategies that this paper explores in 
light of its particular circumstances. Many countries already have adopted many of them to a 
varying extent. The paper’s central purpose is to highlight options and provoke imaginative 
debate and experimentation with strategies that developing countries and their constituencies 
may adopt to better defend themselves in the international trading system. 
 
 
83 Brazil brought twenty-two complaints before the WTO dispute settlement system during the system’s first ten 
years, more than any other developing country. Yet Brazil had litigated no case except where a private company or 
trade association had hired and worked with a law firm to prepare the legal submissions. Interview with officials 
from the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brasilia, Brazil, April 19, 2004.  
84 See e.g., David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law 
and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 WIS. L. REV. 1062. 
